Data disclosure - Iraq 2021: Iraq workforce data is ILO ILOSTAT 2021 data year - the most recent available. Iraq's economy and workforce have changed since 2021. Figures should be treated as a pre-2022 structural baseline, not a current snapshot. Iran data is ILO ILOSTAT 2024.

Key findings

  • Both countries peak at 8.5/10 for clerical worker AI exposure. Iran has 843,800 clerical workers at peak risk; Iraq has 157,600 - a smaller group but proportionally smaller overall workforce.
  • Iraq's risk velocity of 0.5 (near-zero) is not evidence of lower long-term AI risk - it reflects electricity infrastructure failure (40%+ summer outage rates in Baghdad), not workforce structure. Iran's velocity of 4.9 is meaningfully higher despite also being sanctions-constrained.
  • Iraq's 15.5% unemployment rate (World Bank 2025) dwarfs Iran's 8.3% - the second-highest gap between the two countries after GDP per capita ($5,410 Iraq vs $3,924 Iran). High unemployment may reduce employers' incentive to automate in both countries; our data cannot test that.
  • Iraq's service and sales workers account for 23.5% of its workforce (1,989,400 workers, score 3.5/10) - the largest occupation group. Iran's largest group is craft and trades at 4,572,400 (19.0%, score 2.5/10). Both structures tilt toward lower AI exposure averages.

Two oil economies, almost identical average scores - different reasons

Iran and Iraq are neighbours with parallel economic histories: both are oil-dependent MENA economies, both have experienced international isolation (Iraq's post-2003 reconstruction period, Iran's sanctions regime), and both have workforces heavily concentrated in lower AI-exposure occupation categories. The near-identical weighted average AI exposure scores - 3.71 for Iran (ILO ILOSTAT 2024, 24,075,550 workers) and 3.77 for Iraq (ILO ILOSTAT 2021, 8,462,600 workers) - emerge from different workforce structures that happen to produce similar outputs.

Iran's lower average is driven by a large craft and trades workforce: 4,572,400 workers at 2.5/10 AI exposure, the country's biggest occupation group. Iraq's slightly higher average reflects a workforce with a larger service and sales share (23.5% at 3.5/10) but also a proportionally larger professional class (16.6% at 6.5/10) - more than Iran's 12.5%. Iraq's professionals sector at 1,405,000 workers includes a substantial public-sector administrative class built during the post-2003 reconstruction period. Both countries lack OECD-comparable wage data at the ISCO-1 level, so wage comparisons are not possible within this dataset.

32.6M
Combined workers tracked across both countries
0.5 vs 4.9
Risk velocity - Iraq vs Iran (digital readiness)
$1,486
Iraq vs Iran GDP per capita gap (Iraq $5,410 - Iran $3,924)

Side-by-side: occupation groups in both countries

The table below uses ILO ILOSTAT data (CC BY 4.0) for both countries - 2024 data year for Iran, 2021 data year for Iraq. Neither country has OECD-comparable wage data at the ISCO major group level, so wage columns are not included.

Occupation Group AI Score Iran Workers Iran Share Iraq Workers Iraq Share
Clerical support workers 8.5/10 843,800 3.5% 157,600 1.9%
Professionals 6.5/10 3,013,500 12.5% 1,405,000 16.6%
Managers 5.5/10 766,700 3.2% 62,300 0.7%
Technicians and associate professionals 5.5/10 1,430,600 5.9% 478,700 5.7%
Service and sales workers 3.5/10 4,047,900 16.8% 1,989,400 23.5%
Skilled agricultural workers 3.0/10 2,534,900 10.5% 729,900 8.6%
Plant and machine operators 3.0/10 3,448,400 14.3% 914,600 10.8%
Armed forces occupations 2.5/10 n/a n/a 443,200 5.2%
Craft and related trades workers 2.5/10 4,572,400 19.0% 1,791,200 21.2%
Elementary occupations 2.0/10 3,417,300 14.2% 490,700 5.8%

Iraq has a notable armed forces occupation category at 443,200 workers (5.2% of tracked employment, score 2.5/10) - reflecting the post-ISIS reconstruction period when military headcount expanded significantly. This group does not appear in Iran's ILO ILOSTAT data as a separate category. Iraq's professional class at 16.6% is proportionally larger than Iran's 12.5%, partly because post-2003 Iraq built a large public administration apparatus supported by oil revenues. Both of those structural features predate the 2021 data year and may have shifted since.

Why velocity 0.5 does not mean Iraq is safer - it means thin digital infrastructure

Risk velocity is a digital infrastructure index (broadband and secure servers per capita, World Bank). It does not measure how quickly AI tools will be deployed, and it does not include capital, regulation or adoption. Iraq's velocity of 0.5 is one of the lowest in the WorldJobsData dataset. This does not mean Iraqi workers face less AI exposure. It means the preconditions for deployment are absent right now.

Iraq's electricity infrastructure is chronically deficient. The country generates roughly 24,000 megawatts of installed capacity against demand that peaks above 30,000 megawatts in summer - producing outages of 8 to 12 hours per day in Baghdad and longer in southern provinces (Iraq Ministry of Electricity reports, 2024). AI deployment at scale requires reliable 24/7 power for data centres, cloud computing infrastructure, and the connected devices that run AI workflows. In this environment, even employers who want to adopt AI tools face basic operational constraints that make sustainable deployment impossible.

Iraq's telecommunications infrastructure is also significantly below regional average. Mobile broadband penetration and fixed internet connectivity lag Gulf neighbours by a decade in most metrics. Without reliable high-speed internet, cloud-based AI services - which represent the dominant and cheapest deployment model globally - cannot function at enterprise scale. Iran faces sanctions on US technology platforms, but it has significantly better domestic electricity and internet infrastructure than Iraq. Iran's velocity of 4.9 is higher: constrained digital infrastructure, but more of it.

Iraq's 15.5% unemployment rate is the second-highest figure among the countries compared in this batch. When workers are already surplus and cheap, the business case for automation weakens even before the infrastructure gap is factored in.

Iran's larger professional class has greater exposure in analytical roles

Iran's professional class at 3,013,500 workers (12.5% of total, score 6.5/10) is more than twice the size of Iraq's 1,405,000 professional workers in absolute terms. For AI exposure purposes, professionals face automation risk primarily in analytical, drafting, classification, and advisory tasks - the kind of knowledge work that large language models perform most effectively. Iran's professional sector includes engineers, scientists, doctors, lawyers, and teachers, many with strong STEM training.

For Iranian professionals, the sanctions technology gap creates an interesting double bind. Their task-level exposure to AI disruption is real (score 6.5/10). But the tools that would actually displace their analytical work - frontier AI platforms, enterprise-grade LLM APIs - are precisely the US-origin tools blocked by OFAC export controls. Iran is developing domestic AI alternatives under state programs, but no Iranian domestic AI product has yet reached the capability threshold at which it would materially reduce demand for professional analytical labour at scale. This creates a temporary buffer that could disappear rapidly if geopolitical conditions change or domestic capability accelerates.

Economy context: Iran vs Iraq

Indicator Iran Iraq Source
GDP per capita $3,924 $5,410 World Bank, 2025
Unemployment rate 8.3% 15.48% World Bank, 2025
HDI (rank) 0.799 (rank 75) 0.695 (rank 126) UNDP HDR 2025
Avg AI exposure 3.71/10 3.77/10 WorldJobsData scoring
Risk velocity 4.9 0.5 WorldJobsData scoring
Total workers tracked 24.1M (2024) 8.5M (2021) ILO ILOSTAT

The safest jobs from AI in both countries

Both countries share the same floor on AI exposure. Elementary occupations score 2.0/10 in both - covering 3,417,300 workers in Iran and 490,700 in Iraq (ILO ILOSTAT 2024 and 2021 respectively). These include cleaners, labourers, refuse workers, and other physical task workers in variable environments. Craft and related trades workers score 2.5/10 in both countries: Iran has 4,572,400 craft workers (its largest occupation group, 19% of total), Iraq has 1,791,200 (21.2% of total).

Occupation Group AI Score Iran Workers Iraq Workers
Elementary occupations2.0/103,417,300490,700
Craft and related trades workers2.5/104,572,4001,791,200
Armed forces occupations (Iraq only)2.5/10n/a443,200
Skilled agricultural workers3.0/102,534,900729,900
Plant and machine operators3.0/103,448,400914,600

What this means for workers in both countries

For Iranian workers, the clerical sector at 843,800 workers and score 8.5/10 has high exposure; sanctions, a domestic AI ecosystem still at early stages and 8.3% unemployment are context our data does not measure. How these factors affect adoption is not something our data can say. Iranian professionals at 3,013,500 workers face the most complex picture: their task exposure is real (6.5/10) but the tools that would enact it are blocked.

For Iraqi workers, the velocity score of 0.5 reflects thin digital infrastructure rather than long-term safety. Iraq's risk velocity of 0.5 reflects 17.6 broadband subscriptions per 100 people but only 35 secure servers per million (World Bank 2024). If Iraq's electricity and internet infrastructure improve, the underlying occupational exposure would matter more. Iraq's 15.5% unemployment rate means workers in exposed roles have less bargaining power and fewer alternatives than their counterparts in higher-employment economies. The double burden of AI exposure and pre-existing high unemployment is a risk factor not captured in the score alone.

Explore Iran and Iraq workforce data

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Methodology

Iran employment figures are from ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0), 2024 data year, covering 24,075,550 workers. Iraq employment figures are from ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0), 2021 data year, covering 8,462,600 workers. Iraq's 2021 data is the most recent available from ILO ILOSTAT; figures should be treated as a structural baseline. Neither country has OECD-comparable wage data at the ISCO major group level. AI exposure scores are research-based estimates per ISCO-08 occupation group, informed by Frey-Osborne (Oxford), OECD, and IMF studies on task-level automation susceptibility. Economy indicators from World Bank Open Data (CC BY 4.0) and UNDP Human Development Report 2025 (2023 data year, CC BY 3.0 IGO). Scores are estimates, not official forecasts.

AI exposure, robotics, offshoring and work-from-home scores are model-estimated: an AI language model (Claude Opus 4.7) scored each ISCO-08 occupation group on 28 May 2026, guided by published research. They are informed judgements, not measurements, and not forecasts of job losses. "Risk velocity" and its time windows come from a digital-infrastructure index (broadband and secure servers), not from occupations or measured AI adoption. Read the full methodology and how the scores were checked.

Frequently asked questions

Which Iran and Iraq jobs face the most AI risk in 2026?
Clerical support workers score 8.5/10 in both countries. Iran has 843,800 clerical workers at peak AI risk; Iraq has 157,600. Professionals score 6.5/10 in both - Iran 3,013,500, Iraq 1,405,000 workers.
How many Iran and Iraq workers are tracked for AI risk?
Iran covers 24,076,000 workers via ILO ILOSTAT 2024 data year. Iraq covers 8,463,000 workers via ILO ILOSTAT 2021 data year. Iraq's data predates recent escalations and should be treated as a pre-2022 baseline.
Which jobs are safest from AI in Iran and Iraq?
Elementary occupations score 2.0/10 in Iran (3,417,300 workers) and Iraq (490,700 workers). Craft and trades workers score 2.5/10, with Iran's 4,572,400 craft workers forming the country's largest occupation group.
Where does the Iran and Iraq workforce data come from?
Both datasets are from ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0). Iran data year is 2024. Iraq data year is 2021 - the most recent available. Economy data is from World Bank Open Data 2025 and UNDP Human Development Report 2025.

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