Key findings

  • Both the US and Iran peak at 8.5/10 for clerical support workers - the same maximum vulnerability score, but the US has 16.2 million workers in that group versus Iran's 843,800, and the US has the capital and access to actually deploy AI at scale now.
  • The US average AI exposure of 5.07/10 versus Iran's 3.71/10 is driven primarily by Iran's large craft and trades workforce (4.57 million workers, score 2.5) and skilled agricultural sector (2.53 million, score 3.0) - combined, 7.1 million workers in the two lowest-risk manual groups.
  • Iran's 14% female labour force participation rate (World Bank 2025) is among the world's lowest - AI exposure risk in Iran falls almost entirely on male workers, a structural distortion invisible in the headline score.
  • US risk velocity is 10.0/10; Iran's is 4.9/10 (12.1 fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people, which holds the score down, and 7,226 secure servers per million, above the cap; World Bank 2024). The index measures digital infrastructure only. Iran's average AI exposure score of 3.71 is a separate measure. Whether sanctions limit Iranian access to AI tools is not something our data measures.

Same peak score, completely different deployment reality

The shared 8.5/10 peak for clerical workers is the most important number in this comparison - and the most misleading if read in isolation. AI exposure scores measure task susceptibility: whether the core tasks of a role fall within current AI capability. They do not measure employer capital, technology access, economic incentive, or the political environment governing whether those tools can be purchased and deployed. On every one of those dimensions, the US and Iran diverge sharply.

US GDP per capita reached $90,026 in 2025 (World Bank Open Data). Iran's stood at $3,924 in the same year - a 23x gap. Enterprise AI deployment is capital-intensive. Software licences, cloud infrastructure, system integration, retraining, and the organisational restructuring required to replace clerical workflows with AI all carry upfront costs. American employers in financial services, insurance, healthcare administration, and legal services have both the capital and the competitive pressure to move fast. Iranian employers, operating under the world's most extensive unilateral sanctions regime with limited access to the US dollar financial system and blocked from purchasing most Western technology, face an entirely different set of constraints.

Iran's ILO ILOSTAT data (CC BY 4.0, 2024 data year) covers 24,075,550 workers across all major ISCO-08 occupation groups. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics OOH, May 2025 reference, covers 143,978,200 workers. Together that is 168.1 million workers whose AI exposure can be compared directly on the same scoring framework.

167.1M
Combined workers across both countries
23x
US vs Iran GDP per capita gap (World Bank 2025)
2.0/10
Lowest AI score in both countries - elementary occupations

Side-by-side: occupation groups in both countries

The table below compares both countries across all major ISCO-08 occupation categories using ILO ILOSTAT data for Iran (2024 data year) and BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH), May 2025 reference, for the US, both accessed via ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0). Iran wage data is not available at the ISCO-1 level in the ILO ILOSTAT series for this data year.

Occupation Group AI Score US Workers US Median Wage Iran Workers
Clerical support workers 8.5/10 16,227,900 $46,818 843,800
Professionals 6.5/10 42,620,400 $88,936 3,013,500
Technicians and associate professionals 5.5/10 8,349,900 $40,091 1,430,600
Managers 5.5/10 12,706,000 $118,377 766,700
Service and sales workers 3.5/10 29,398,700 $41,200 4,047,900
Skilled agricultural workers 3.0/10 915,200 $36,646 2,534,900
Plant and machine operators 3.0/10 18,762,700 $46,812 3,448,400
Craft and related trades workers 2.5/10 11,156,900 $57,092 4,572,400
Elementary occupations 2.0/10 3,840,500 $38,174 3,417,300

The ISCO-08 framework produces identical AI exposure scores across both countries because task susceptibility is an occupational property, not a national one. What differs radically is the proportion of workers in each group, the wages they earn, the economic environment that determines when tasks get automated, and the geopolitical environment that determines which tools employers can access at all.

Why the average gap is 5.07 vs 3.71 - Iran's workforce structure

The 1.36-point gap between US average AI exposure (5.07/10) and Iran's (3.71/10) is explained almost entirely by where Iran's workers are concentrated. Iran's two largest occupation groups are craft and related trades workers (4,572,400 workers, score 2.5/10) and service and sales workers (4,047,900 workers, score 3.5/10). Together those two groups account for 8.62 million Iranian workers - more than a third of the total workforce - concentrated at the lower end of the AI exposure spectrum.

Iran also has a substantial skilled agricultural workforce of 2,534,900 workers scoring 3.0/10 (ILO ILOSTAT 2024). This reflects Iran's agricultural economy, which employs a meaningfully larger share of the working population than the US (where skilled agriculture accounts for just 915,200 workers). Craft, trades, and agricultural work is fundamentally physical and variable in environment - tasks that resist current AI capabilities and will continue to do so for years even in technologically advanced economies, let alone one where AI infrastructure access is constrained by sanctions.

By contrast, the US workforce is concentrated in knowledge-economy and service-economy roles that score much higher. The US professionals group alone covers 42,620,400 workers - nearly double Iran's entire labour force. US clerical workers at 16,227,900 are nearly 20x Iran's clerical group of 843,800. This tilt toward white-collar, administrative, and professional occupations pushes the US average well above Iran's.

Iran's craft sector at 4.57 million workers is the single largest occupation group in the country - scoring 2.5/10. It is also the group our model scores as least exposed to AI in any economy.

The sanctions dimension: why AI access is not just an economic question

Iran operates under one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes in the world. US sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) prohibit most US technology exports to Iran, including cloud computing services, enterprise software, and AI platform access from US-headquartered providers. The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) additionally restrict hardware exports, including the high-performance GPUs and AI accelerators required for on-premise AI deployment at scale.

This means that even for Iranian employers who have the economic incentive to automate - and some in oil, gas, and financial services do - the primary AI tools available to US employers are either legally inaccessible or practically inaccessible for Iranian counterparts. Leading AI platforms from US providers including enterprise-grade large language model APIs are subject to these restrictions. Iran has responded by developing domestic AI programs under state direction and pursuing technology relationships with countries outside the Western sanctions framework, but domestic frontier AI capability remains limited compared to the US commercial ecosystem.

Iranian clerical workers score 8.5/10 on task exposure, the same as US clerical workers. Whether Iranian employers can access the tools that would act on that exposure is a separate question. Sanctions may limit access to some Western AI platforms, but our data does not measure access or adoption, so we cannot say how much.

Iran's female labour force participation: the structural invisibility

Iran's female labour force participation rate of 15.65% (World Bank 2025) is one of the world's lowest. For context, the world figure is 55.1% and the US female participation rate is 69.0% (World Bank 2025, ages 15-64). This has a direct and important consequence for how AI risk is distributed within Iran: it falls almost entirely on male workers.

Of Iran's 24.1 million tracked workers, the overwhelming majority are male. Clerical occupations in many countries tend to have higher female representation - but in Iran, the extreme skew in labour force participation means the 843,800 Iranian clerical workers at peak AI exposure (8.5/10) are predominantly men. This is the opposite of the US pattern, where women represent a larger share of administrative and clerical roles.

The 14% female participation figure also constrains Iran's aggregate AI exposure score from another angle: many of the higher-scoring professional and knowledge-economy roles that would push the average upward in other countries are underrepresented in Iran's labour market precisely because women participate so infrequently. Iran's workforce structure - dominated by male workers in physical trades, agriculture, and industry - inherently tilts toward lower AI exposure categories at the aggregate level.

Economy context: US vs Iran side by side

The table below puts both countries' economic indicators side by side using World Bank Open Data (CC BY 4.0, 2025) and UNDP Human Development Report 2025 (HDR 2025, 2023 data year, licence CC BY 3.0 IGO).

Indicator United States Iran Source
GDP per capita $90,026 $3,924 World Bank, 2025
Unemployment rate ~4% (BLS est.) 8.3% BLS / World Bank, 2025
Female labour force participation 69.0% 15.65% World Bank, 2025
Population n/a 92.4M World Bank, 2025
HDI 0.938 (rank 20) 0.799 (rank 75) UNDP HDR 2025
Total workers tracked 144.0M 24.1M ILO ILOSTAT 2024/2025
Weighted avg AI exposure 5.07/10 3.71/10 WorldJobsData scoring
Peak AI exposure score 8.5/10 8.5/10 WorldJobsData scoring

Iran's 8.3% unemployment rate (World Bank 2025) deserves specific comment. It is more than twice the US rate. High unemployment with low female participation suggests a labour market that is structurally constrained rather than at capacity. This data cannot show how unemployment affects employers' incentive to adopt AI.

Iran's HDI of 0.799 (UNDP HDR 2025, rank 75, 2023 data year) reflects reasonably strong health and education outcomes by global standards. Iran has historically invested in university education and technical training. But a well-educated workforce in an economy cut off from global technology markets and constrained by high unemployment faces limited options for channelling that capability into AI-adjacent productivity growth.

The safest jobs from AI in both countries

At the bottom of the AI exposure spectrum, both countries converge. US elementary occupations score 2.0/10 - 3,840,500 workers earning a median of $38,174 per year (BLS OOH, May 2025 reference). Iran's elementary occupations also score 2.0/10, covering 3,417,300 workers (ILO ILOSTAT 2024). Physical tasks in variable, unstructured environments resist automation in both countries equally.

Safest Occupation Country AI Score Workers US Median Wage
Elementary occupationsUnited States2.0/103,840,500$38,174
Elementary occupationsIran2.0/103,417,300n/a
Craft and related trades workersUnited States2.5/1011,156,900$57,092
Craft and related trades workersIran2.5/104,572,400n/a
Skilled agricultural workersUnited States3.0/10915,200$36,646
Skilled agricultural workersIran3.0/102,534,900n/a
Plant and machine operatorsIran3.0/103,448,400n/a

Iran's craft and trades sector at 4,572,400 workers is particularly notable - it is Iran's single largest occupation group, representing roughly 19% of all tracked employment (ILO ILOSTAT 2024). Iran's industrial and construction economy, including large petrochemical and energy infrastructure, sustains a proportionally large physical-sector workforce. These workers score 2.5/10 on AI exposure. They are also - importantly - the group most insulated from displacement even if AI deployment accelerates, because the physical variability of their work on construction sites, in workshops, and in energy facilities is hard for current robotic systems to handle.

What this means for workers in both countries

For US clerical workers, the exposure is high: the 16,227,900 clerical workers score 8.5/10. Whether and how fast AI changes those jobs depends on employers' decisions, which neither the exposure score nor the risk velocity index measures.

For US professionals (42,620,400 workers, score 6.5/10, median wage $88,936 per year from BLS OOH, May 2025 reference), the picture is more nuanced. AI tools augment rather than replace in most professional workflows for now, but the pace of capability development means roles in legal research, financial analysis, and medical documentation face meaningful exposure in task composition. Workers in these roles who adapt their skills to work alongside AI tools are better positioned than those who treat their workflow as static.

For Iranian workers, the exposure scores are the same as for US workers in the same occupations: Iran's 843,800 clerical workers are at 8.5/10. Iran's risk velocity of 4.9/10 reflects lower broadband access than the US. Beyond that, our data cannot say how sanctions, wages or the domestic AI ecosystem affect adoption.

Iran's craft workers (4,572,400 at 2.5/10) and agricultural workers (2,534,900 at 3.0/10) face the lowest risk of any group in either country. Their work is physical, variable, and dependent on local knowledge of conditions that AI systems handle poorly. For these 7.1 million Iranian workers, AI exposure is low.

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Methodology

US employment and wage figures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH), May 2025 reference, accessed via ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0). Total US employment covered: 143,978,200 workers. Iran employment figures are from ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0), 2024 data year. Total Iran employment covered: 24,075,550 workers. Iran wage data is not available at ISCO-1 level for the 2024 data year in the ILO ILOSTAT series. AI exposure scores are research-based estimates per ISCO-08 occupation group, informed by Frey-Osborne (Oxford), OECD, and IMF studies on task-level automation susceptibility. Economy indicators (GDP per capita, unemployment, labour force participation) are from World Bank Open Data (CC BY 4.0), most recent year available per indicator. HDI data from UNDP Human Development Report 2025 (2023 data year, licence CC BY 3.0 IGO). US unemployment (~4%) is a BLS estimate; the World Bank series does not include a separate US unemployment figure for this data year. Scores are estimates, not official forecasts, and do not capture country-specific adoption speed, sanctions effects, or informal economy differences.

AI exposure, robotics, offshoring and work-from-home scores are model-estimated: an AI language model (Claude Opus 4.7) scored each ISCO-08 occupation group on 28 May 2026, guided by published research. They are informed judgements, not measurements, and not forecasts of job losses. "Risk velocity" and its time windows come from a digital-infrastructure index (broadband and secure servers), not from occupations or measured AI adoption. Read the full methodology and how the scores were checked.

Frequently asked questions

Which country scores higher on AI readiness - the US or Iran?
The US scores 10.0 on risk velocity and Iran 4.9. Both peak at 8.5/10 for clerical AI exposure. Risk velocity measures broadband and secure servers, not job-loss timing or sanctions.
How many US and Iranian workers are at risk from AI?
The US has 144.0 million workers tracked via BLS OOH, 2025 reference, with 16.2 million clerical workers at peak 8.5/10 risk. Iran has 24.1 million via ILO ILOSTAT 2024, with 843,800 clerical workers at peak risk.
Which jobs are safest from AI in the US and Iran?
Both share the same floor: elementary occupations score 2.0/10 and craft and trades workers score 2.5/10 in both countries. Iran's craft sector is especially large at 4.57 million workers, Iran's biggest employment group.
Where does the US and Iran workforce data come from?
US data is from BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH), May 2025 reference, via ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0). Iran data is ILO ILOSTAT 2024 data year. Economy indicators are from World Bank Open Data 2025 and UNDP HDR 2025.

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