Key findings
- Both the UK and Argentina peak at 8.5/10 for clerical support workers - but Argentina's clerical share of 11.5% (1,524,200 workers) is actually higher than the UK's 8.9% (3,018,400 workers). Yet Argentina's lower average score reflects where its remaining workforce sits: heavily concentrated in services and trades at the low end of the exposure spectrum.
- The UK's weighted average AI exposure of 5.08/10 versus Argentina's 4.38/10 is driven by Argentina's large service and sales sector: 3,391,900 workers (25.7% of the workforce) scoring 3.5/10 - the single largest Argentine occupation group, acting as a structural buffer on the overall average.
- UK risk velocity is 10.0. Argentina's is 7.2. Risk velocity is built only from broadband and secure-server counts (World Bank): Argentina has 26.1 fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people, about half the cap of 50, which is what holds its score at 7.2. Our data has no broadband figure for the UK, so its 10.0 rests on 68,449 secure servers per million people.
- Argentina's informal economy is estimated at 40-45% of total employment by the ILO. The formal 13.2 million workers likely understates the true Argentine labour force significantly - meaning the AI risk picture for Argentine workers is both larger and more complex than the headline figure suggests.
Same peak score, completely different deployment context
The shared 8.5/10 peak for clerical support workers is the most striking number in this comparison - and the most easily misread. AI exposure scores measure task susceptibility: whether the core tasks of an occupation fall within current AI capability boundaries. They do not measure employer capital, macroeconomic stability, technology infrastructure, or the political environment governing whether AI tools get deployed at scale. On every one of those dimensions, the UK and Argentina diverge substantially.
UK GDP per capita reached $57,602 in 2025 (World Bank Open Data). Argentina's stood at $14,898 in the same year - a 3.9x gap. Argentina's economic history is also very different: a 2001 sovereign default, a 2018-2019 IMF programme of $57 billion, and 2023-2024 inflation peaking above 200% annually before the Milei stabilisation programme. We have no data on how those events affect enterprise AI adoption, and the risk velocity index does not include them.
ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0) 2025 data covers 34,086,000 UK workers and 13,198,000 formal Argentine workers. Together that is 47.3 million workers comparable on the same ISCO-08 occupation framework.
Side-by-side: occupation groups in both countries
The table below compares both countries across all major ISCO-08 occupation categories using ILO ILOSTAT data (CC BY 4.0, 2025 data year) for both the UK and Argentina. OECD median wage data is available for the UK (OECD Employment Outlook 2025, average annual wage $66,299) but Argentina is not an OECD member and no comparable wage series is available at the ISCO-1 level for Argentina in the ILO ILOSTAT dataset for this data year.
| Occupation Group | AI Score | UK Workers | UK Share | AR Workers | AR Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clerical support workers | 8.5/10 | 3,018,400 | 8.9% | 1,524,200 | 11.5% |
| Professionals | 6.5/10 | 8,565,600 | 25.1% | 1,761,700 | 13.3% |
| Managers | 5.5/10 | 5,547,100 | 16.3% | 604,900 | 4.6% |
| Technicians and associate professionals | 5.5/10 | 4,816,500 | 14.1% | 1,203,300 | 9.1% |
| Service and sales workers | 3.5/10 | 5,085,000 | 14.9% | 3,391,900 | 25.7% |
| Plant and machine operators | 3.0/10 | 1,475,300 | 4.3% | 1,195,300 | 9.1% |
| Skilled agricultural workers | 3.0/10 | 353,500 | 1.0% | 23,200 | 0.2% |
| Armed forces occupations | 2.5/10 | 30,200 | 0.1% | 33,800 | 0.3% |
| Craft and related trades workers | 2.5/10 | 2,085,900 | 6.1% | 1,798,000 | 13.6% |
| Elementary occupations | 2.0/10 | 3,108,100 | 9.1% | 1,662,100 | 12.6% |
The ISCO-08 framework produces identical AI exposure scores across both countries because task susceptibility is an occupational property, not a national one. What differs radically is the proportion of workers in each group. The UK workforce is tilted heavily toward high-scoring white-collar occupations: professionals (25.1%), managers (16.3%), technicians (14.1%), and clericals (8.9%) together account for 64.4% of UK employment. Argentina's equivalent share is only 38.5% - with the remaining 61.5% concentrated in service, trades, elementary, and operator roles that score between 2.0 and 3.5.
Why Argentina's clerical share is higher but average is lower
One of the most counterintuitive findings in this comparison: Argentina's clerical support workers represent 11.5% of the formal workforce, compared to the UK's 8.9%. Argentina has a proportionally larger exposed clerical sector than the UK. Yet Argentina's weighted average AI exposure (4.38/10) is nearly a full point below the UK's (5.08/10).
The explanation lies entirely in what Argentina has instead of white-collar professionals. Argentina's service and sales workers represent 25.7% of the formal workforce - 3,391,900 workers scoring 3.5/10. This is Argentina's single largest occupation group by a wide margin, and it drags the national average down substantially. The UK's service and sales group is proportionally smaller at 14.9%, leaving more weight on the higher-scoring professional, manager, and technician categories that push the UK average up.
Argentina's craft and related trades workers are also proportionally significant at 13.6% (1,798,000 workers, score 2.5/10) and elementary occupations at 12.6% (1,662,100 workers, score 2.0/10). Together, Argentina's three lowest-scoring groups - service/sales, craft/trades, and elementary - cover 51.9% of the formal workforce. The equivalent UK share is only 30.1%. This structural concentration in lower-scoring occupations is the mechanical driver of Argentina's lower average, even with a larger clerical share at the top.
Argentina's service and sales sector at 25.7% of the workforce (3.5/10 score) is the structural buffer that keeps the country's average AI exposure nearly a full point below the UK's - despite Argentina having a higher clerical share at the top.
The economic crisis dimension: context the index does not capture
The UK's risk velocity score of 10.0 and Argentina's 7.2 differ only because of broadband: Argentina's 26.1 subscriptions per 100 people is about half the cap. The difference says nothing about willingness to adopt AI, which our data does not measure.
Enterprise AI adoption depends on factors the index does not measure: stable electricity, reliable broadband, and a planning horizon of years rather than quarters. Argentina's economic history complicates the last of these. The 2001 sovereign default destroyed business investment confidence for years; the 2018-2019 IMF programme came alongside peso devaluations exceeding 50%; and the 2023-2024 inflation episode, above 200% annually before Milei's stabilisation, made multi-year software contracts hard for most firms.
Milei's reforms since late 2023 - aggressive peso devaluation, elimination of capital controls, public spending cuts - have begun stabilising the macroeconomic picture. Monthly inflation fell from a peak of 25.5% in December 2023 to single digits by mid-2025. Whether that changes enterprise AI adoption is not something this data can show.
Argentina's informal economy: the data gap
The ILO ILOSTAT Argentina data covers 13,198,000 formal workers. This is a significant undercount. The ILO estimates Argentina's informal employment at 40-45% of total employment. If the informal sector represents approximately 45% of all work, the true Argentine labour force involved in economic activity is likely 20-24 million workers when informal employment is included.
The AI exposure implications of this gap are complex. Informal workers in Argentina are disproportionately concentrated in low-scoring occupations: street vending, domestic service, informal construction, subsistence agriculture. These roles score between 2.0 and 3.5/10 on the AI exposure framework. Including them would almost certainly lower Argentina's weighted average exposure further - pushing it even further below the UK's - while simultaneously concentrating AI risk discussion on the formal clerical and professional sector where exposure is highest and where informal economy participation is lowest.
Any headline comparison of Argentina to the UK using ILO ILOSTAT formal data therefore understates both total Argentine employment and the structural concentration of formal sector workers in higher-AI-exposure roles relative to the economy as a whole.
Economy context: UK vs Argentina side by side
The table below uses World Bank Open Data (CC BY 4.0, 2025) and UNDP Human Development Report 2025 (HDR 2025, 2023 data year, licence CC BY 3.0 IGO).
| Indicator | United Kingdom | Argentina | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDP per capita | $57,602 | $14,898 | World Bank, 2025 |
| Unemployment rate | 4.75% | 7.14% | World Bank, 2025 |
| OECD average annual wage | $66,299 | Not available | OECD Employment Outlook 2025 |
| HDI | 0.946 (rank 13) | 0.865 (rank 47) | UNDP HDR 2025 |
| Total workers tracked (formal) | 34.1M | 13.2M | ILO ILOSTAT 2025 |
| Weighted avg AI exposure | 5.08/10 | 4.38/10 | WorldJobsData scoring |
| Risk velocity | 10.0 (very high readiness) | 7.2 (high readiness) | WorldJobsData scoring |
| Peak AI exposure score | 8.5/10 | 8.5/10 | WorldJobsData scoring |
Argentina's unemployment rate of 7.14% (World Bank 2025) is notably higher than the UK's 4.75%. In an economy where labour is more plentiful, the cost saving from automating a role is likely smaller, which could weaken employers' incentive to adopt AI; this data cannot test that.
The HDI comparison is instructive: UK at 0.946 (rank 13, UNDP HDR 2025) versus Argentina at 0.865 (rank 47). Argentina's HDI reflects genuinely strong educational attainment by Latin American standards - Buenos Aires produces a large number of university graduates, and Argentina has significant technology sector development centred on Buenos Aires. The question is not workforce capability; it is macroeconomic stability and the investment environment that determines whether that capability gets directed into AI-adjacent productivity growth.
The most AI-exposed UK occupations
The UK's professional workforce is the largest occupation group in the country at 8,565,600 workers - 25.1% of total employment - scoring 6.5/10. This reflects the UK economy's deep tilt toward knowledge-intensive services: financial services concentrated in London, professional services including legal and consulting, healthcare, and technology sectors. These workers face meaningful exposure - not the 8.5/10 peak of clericals, but a score that reflects genuine task susceptibility in areas like legal research, financial analysis, medical documentation, and management consulting.
| Occupation (UK) | AI Score | Workers | Share of Workforce |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clerical support workers | 8.5/10 | 3,018,400 | 8.9% |
| Professionals | 6.5/10 | 8,565,600 | 25.1% |
| Managers | 5.5/10 | 5,547,100 | 16.3% |
| Technicians and associate professionals | 5.5/10 | 4,816,500 | 14.1% |
| Service and sales workers | 3.5/10 | 5,085,000 | 14.9% |
The UK's manager category at 5,547,100 workers (16.3%) scoring 5.5/10 is particularly notable in size. The UK economy has historically generated a high proportion of management-layer roles across financial services, healthcare (NHS management), retail head offices, and professional services. AI tools that streamline reporting, scheduling, and decision-support are already entering this layer. The 5.5/10 score reflects genuine exposure but also the judgment, relationship, and accountability dimensions of managerial work that AI is more likely to augment than replace.
The safest jobs from AI in both countries
At the bottom of the AI exposure spectrum, both countries converge on the same floor. Elementary occupations score 2.0/10 in both countries - covering 3,108,100 UK workers and 1,662,100 Argentine workers (ILO ILOSTAT 2025). Physical tasks in variable environments - cleaning, waste collection, material handling, basic construction labouring - resist automation regardless of economic conditions.
| Safest Occupation | Country | AI Score | Workers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elementary occupations | United Kingdom | 2.0/10 | 3,108,100 |
| Elementary occupations | Argentina | 2.0/10 | 1,662,100 |
| Craft and related trades workers | United Kingdom | 2.5/10 | 2,085,900 |
| Craft and related trades workers | Argentina | 2.5/10 | 1,798,000 |
| Plant and machine operators | United Kingdom | 3.0/10 | 1,475,300 |
| Plant and machine operators | Argentina | 3.0/10 | 1,195,300 |
Argentina's craft and trades workers at 13.6% of the formal workforce (1,798,000 workers, score 2.5/10) represent the country's second-largest occupation group. Argentina has a substantial industrial and construction sector - auto manufacturing concentrated around Cordoba and Buenos Aires, food processing, and significant construction activity. These workers score 2.5/10 on AI exposure and have low AI exposure even as the macroeconomic environment stabilises.
The UK skilled agricultural sector is notably small at just 353,500 workers (1.0% of employment), reflecting the UK's highly mechanised, large-scale farming base where most basic agricultural labour has already been automated by conventional machinery. Argentina's formal skilled agricultural count of 23,200 (0.2%) is proportionally even smaller - partly because a large share of Argentina's agricultural labour is informal and therefore not captured in the ILOSTAT data, and partly because the pampas (the central agricultural heartland) is dominated by highly mechanised soybean, corn, and wheat production requiring relatively few formal workers per hectare.
What this means for workers in both countries
For UK clerical workers, exposure is high: the 3,018,400 UK workers scoring 8.5/10 are in roles - document processing, data extraction, correspondence automation, scheduling - where current AI tools are directly applicable, including in financial services, insurance, NHS administration, and legal support. The risk velocity of 10.0 shows strong digital infrastructure; it does not measure how many UK employers have deployed AI tools.
UK professionals (8,565,600 workers, 6.5/10) face a more nuanced picture. Our scores treat augmentation as more likely than replacement for most professional workflows. But lawyers using AI-assisted research are more productive than those who are not, creating pressure on firm hiring. The same applies to financial analysts, management consultants, and healthcare clinicians handling documentation. Workers who adapt their workflow to incorporate AI tools are better positioned than those treating current practices as static. See the full UK AI job risk analysis for occupation-level detail.
For Argentine clerical workers, the 1,524,200 workers scoring 8.5/10 face the same task exposure as clerical workers elsewhere. How much that exposure becomes real job change depends on employer adoption, which neither the exposure score nor the risk velocity index measures. The full Argentina AI job risk analysis covers the country in detail, including informal economy considerations.
For Argentine service and sales workers (3,391,900 workers, score 3.5/10), the AI risk question is even more distant. These roles - retail, hospitality, personal services, security - involve physical presence, human interaction, and situational variability that AI handles poorly. They also include a very large informal sector component not captured in the 13.2 million formal figure. For workers in this group, our data cannot say how much AI will matter, because the informal sector is not captured.
Compare this to the broader US AI job risk picture and the US vs world comparison for global context. For a European peer comparison, the UK vs France comparison shows how two similarly developed economies with different workforce structures compare on AI exposure.
Explore UK and Argentina workforce data live
See AI exposure and job risk for all occupations in both countries. Filter, sort, and compare across 206 countries.
Was this comparison useful?
Let us know what you think - your reaction helps us understand what to cover next.
Thanks for your reaction!
Get new country analyses, data updates, and AI labour market insights. No spam - one email when something worth reading drops.
Methodology
UK and Argentina employment figures are both from ILO ILOSTAT (CC BY 4.0), 2025 data year. Total UK employment covered: 34,086,000 workers. Total Argentina formal employment covered: 13,198,000 workers. Argentina's informal sector is estimated at 40-45% of total employment by the ILO and is not captured in ILOSTAT formal data. OECD average annual wage data for the UK ($66,299) is from OECD Employment Outlook 2025. No equivalent OECD wage series exists for Argentina (not an OECD member). AI exposure scores are research-based estimates per ISCO-08 occupation group, informed by Frey-Osborne (Oxford), OECD, and IMF studies on task-level automation susceptibility. Risk velocity scores are built from World Bank broadband and secure-server indicators; they do not include task susceptibility. Economy indicators (GDP per capita, unemployment) are from World Bank Open Data (CC BY 4.0), most recent year available. HDI data from UNDP Human Development Report 2025 (2023 data year, licence CC BY 3.0 IGO). Scores are estimates, not official forecasts, and do not capture country-specific adoption speed, informal economy differences, or political factors.
AI exposure, robotics, offshoring and work-from-home scores are model-estimated: an AI language model (Claude Opus 4.7) scored each ISCO-08 occupation group on 28 May 2026, guided by published research. They are informed judgements, not measurements, and not forecasts of job losses. "Risk velocity" and its time windows come from a digital-infrastructure index (broadband and secure servers), not from occupations or measured AI adoption. Read the full methodology and how the scores were checked.
Frequently asked questions
Which UK jobs are most at risk from AI in 2026?
How many UK and Argentine workers face high AI disruption risk?
Which UK and Argentine jobs are safest from AI?
Where does the UK and Argentina workforce data come from?
Data sources
- ILO ILOSTAT - International Labour Organization Statistics, UK and Argentina 2025 data year (CC BY 4.0)
- World Bank Open Data - GDP per capita, unemployment, labour force participation (CC BY 4.0), most recent year per indicator
- UNDP Human Development Report 2025 - HDI (2023 data year, licence CC BY 3.0 IGO)
- OECD Employment Outlook 2025 - average annual wages for OECD member countries (UK: $66,299)
- Frey, C.B. and Osborne, M.A. (2017). The future of employment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change.
- OECD - The Future of Work and Skills
- IMF - Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work (2024)
Spotted an error or know a better source? Report it and we will check it against the source data.